State governance of pesticide use and trade in Vietnam  by Van Hoi, Pham et al.
SP
H
a
A
R
R
1
A
A
K
p
s
r
f
m
1
i
t
t
t
h
i
a
i
r
h
p
m
b
o
b
e
G
1
hNJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 67 (2013) 19– 26
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
NJAS -  Wageningen  Journal  of  Life  Sciences
jou rn al h om epage: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /n jas
tate  governance  of  pesticide  use  and  trade  in  Vietnam
ham  Van  Hoi ∗,  Arthur  Mol,  Peter  Oosterveer
anoi University of Agriculture, Gialam Hanoi, Vietnam
 r  t  i  c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 23 April 2009
eceived in revised form
3 September 2013
ccepted 14 September 2013
vailable online 25 October 2013
eywords:
esticide
tate
etailer
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Vietnam  is facing  serious  challenges  with  respect  to  the amount  and  toxicity  of the pesticides  used.
With  hardly  any  domestic  pesticides  production,  Vietnam  experienced  an  exponential  growth  of  both
the  quantity  and  the  value  of  imported  pesticides  in  recent  years.  And  the increasing  import  of newly
formulated  (and  safer)  pesticides  has  not  replaced  or reduced  the  highly  toxic  pesticides  with  low  efﬁ-
cacy.  The  improper  use  of pesticides  by  farmers  (too  high  dosages,  cocktailing  of  pesticides,  inadequate
pre-harvest  intervals  etc.)  has  further  contributed  to  the environmental  and  health  problems  resulting
from  pesticides,  especially  in poorer  areas  where  farmers  have  to largely  rely  on cheap  but often  old  and
more toxic pesticides.  Despite  a growth  in pesticide  policies  and  regulation,  the  state  has  been  unable
to  regulate  the  pesticide  market.  The  main  causes  behind  the  state  failure  in  pesticide  market  regulation
are the  governance  structure  (i.e.,  centralized  decision  making),  large  corruption,  information  distor-armer
arket and environment
tion  and  a failing  legal  system.  To  some  extent,  and  in  some  more  wealthy  areas,  famers  and  retailers
have  emerged  successfully  as  new  pesticide  governance  actors.  But  an  overall  improvement  of  pesticide
registration  and  pesticide  use  can  only  rely  on  better  government  intervention:  more  stringent  imple-
mentation  and  enforcement  of regulations,  more  effective  promotion  of IPM-based  pest  control,  further
public  participation  in  implementation  and  higher  ethics  within  government.
© 2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.. Introduction
Pesticide use in agriculture has two sides. On the one hand it
ncreases agricultural production and output through the reduc-
ion of pests and diseases and related crop loss. On the other hand,
he continuous reliance on pesticides in agriculture poses serious
hreats to both the ecosystem and human health.
As an agriculture-based country, Vietnam is presently paying
igh costs for its reliance on pesticides. With just a few active
ngredients produced domestically, pesticide imports into Vietnam
re approximately US$500 million/year at present. However, the
ndirect costs are much higher: social and environmental costs
elated to pesticide use, the loss of export opportunities due to
igh pesticide residues on products, and an instable agricultural
roductivity associated with a degraded agro-ecosystem. In 2002,
ore than 7,000 cases (involving 7,647 people) of food poisoning
y pesticide residues were reported, causing 277 deaths in 37 out
f the 61 provinces [1]. These numbers exclude “silent” casualties
y pesticides [2]. Besides acute poisoning due to direct and indirect
xposure to pesticides, chronic pesticide poisoning could have an
∗ Corresponding author. Arthur Mol  & Peter Oosterveer:, Environmental Policy
roup, Wageningen University, The Netherlands.
E-mail address: phamhoi@gmail.com (P. Van Hoi).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2013.09.001 All rights reserved.
effect on 2 million Vietnamese farmers (Trung et al., cited in [3]).
The annual costs of pesticide-related domestic human health and
of lost export opportunities for vegetables and fruits in Vietnam is
estimated at US$700 millions [4]. This equals the total estimated
export income of vegetables and fruits in 2010 [5]. And in that ﬁg-
ure the environmental costs of pesticide use are not even included
yet.
While initially state authorities in all countries heavily sup-
ported pesticide use, more recently state efforts concentrated on
reducing or even getting rid of a heavy reliance on pesticides in
agriculture. State authorities in all countries have played a major
role in pesticide regulation, which directly and indirectly affects
industrial pesticide production, pesticide distribution and their use
in agriculture [6,7]. Firstly, state authorities are involved in banning
certain highly toxic pesticides like persistent organic pollutants
(POPs, following the Stockholm Convention), or the US  “Big Green”
[8]). Secondly, states have restricted the market entry of new or the
use of existing pesticides. Reducing the pesticide reliance of agricul-
tural practices is a third main state policy on pesticides. Increased
taxes imposed on pesticide imports and use discourages farmers
from (over)reliance on pesticides [9]. Integrated pest management
(IPM) or organic agriculture promotion programs also aim to reduce
pesticide use in combination with a stabilization or increase of
crop yields [10]. In the 1990s countries such as Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, Netherlands and Guatemala have decreased their annual
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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esticide use by one third, without diminishing crop yields (Edland
997, Pettersson 1997, Pimentel 1997 cited in [10]).
But it is not only developed states that have aimed to reduce
he heavy dependence of agriculture on pesticides. Developmental
tates (cf. [11]), such as Vietnam, have equally strived to reduce
he reliance of agricultural production on highly toxic pesticides.
lthough such developmental states are known for their “strong
rms”–in a sense of authoritatian power which leads and directs the
evelopments, the literature seems to suggest that this strong inﬂu-
nce is more related to economic development as such, and less
o the mitigation of environmental and health effect of economic
evelopment. Developmental states were often believed to have
imited state capacities and capabilities in developing and enforcing
dequate state policies on environmental protection. But recent
evelopments in China [7] and other states [12] provide contrasting
vidence. This article analyses the successes and failures of Viet-
amese state authorities in regulating pesticides for agricultural
urposes, with a focus on the Red River delta region in northern
ietnam. How successful have Vietnamese state authorities been in
egulating the environmental and health effects of agro-pesticides
nd what are the main causes behind any success or failure?
After outlining the main methodology, the paper discusses the
istory and current objectives of Vietnamese state pesticide regu-
ation, and the main pesticide market developments. The main part
f the paper is dedicated to an analysis of the successes and failures
f state pesticide policies, and followed by an analysis of the role
f private actors (especially farmers and retailers) in changing the
esticide market.
. Methodology
This study uses three methodologies: a desk study of ofﬁcial
nd grey policy documents on state pesticide policies; surveys of
esticide retailers and farmers; and in-depth interviews with key
nformants on state pesticide policies. In total, 15 state ofﬁcials
rom the ministerial and district levels (covering four provinces
n the Red River delta: Hanoi, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Nam Dinh)
nd four pesticide company owners have been interviewed, using
emi-structured questionnaires. These interviews, combined with
everal surveys (i.e. on farmers, consumers and exporters that are
ainly discussed elsewhere [13–15]), were conducted from July,
006 to October, 2008.
To get a further and more quantitative insight into the imple-
entation and enforcement of state pesticide policies at ﬁeld level,
wo surveys were conducted in Hanoi, Hai Duong and Hung Yen
rovinces. One survey covered 45 randomly selected pesticide
etailers in agricultural production areas in Hanoi, Hung Yen and
ai Duong provinces. It consisted of open and closed multiple-
hoice questions and focused on understanding current pesticide
etailing and the relations with the state administrative system
nd farmers. The second survey was carried out among farmers
n Hanoi and Hai Duong provinces. In each province, two agricul-
ural communities were selected. In each community between 30
nd 33 farmers were randomly selected, resulting in a total survey
f 125 farmers. These questionnaires focused on agricultural prac-
ices (largely, but not solely focused on the vegetable subsector),
esticide selection and use, and farmer’s perception on changes in
he pesticide market.
. The history of Vietnam’s pesticide policyPesticides were ﬁrstly imported and used in Vietnam in the
id-1950s. From this period until the beginning of the 1980s,
gricultural inputs were centrally managed and agricultural pro-
uction was collectively organized. This centralized managemental of Life Sciences 67 (2013) 19– 26
and collective production, however, turned out to be serious
obstacles for Vietnam’s economic as well as agricultural develop-
ment. Privatization in agricultural production–and other economic
sectors–was ofﬁcially endorsed by the central government through
its Open door policy of 1986. This also marked a shift to private
pesticide imports, formulation, distribution and use in Vietnam.
Since 1986 the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment (MARD) annually issues a list of legal pesticides. From 1992
onward, this list has been speciﬁed into three categories: permit-
ted pesticides, pesticides permitted with restricted use, and banned
pesticides. Pesticides of the second category could only be used at
speciﬁc locations, for speciﬁc crops, while using strict application
methods. However, initially it was not detailed on what loca-
tions/crops/application methods pesticides of this category could
be used. The list of pesticides is annually updated by new (regis-
tered) pesticides. Pesticides that are banned by regulation or are
not re-registered after a given time period due to poor quality and
market demand will automatically disappear from the updated list.
The list serves as the legal basic for pesticide imports, formulation,
distribution, and use, and is of key importance for state pesticide
management at local level.
In 1993, in the Decree no. 92-CP [16], pesticides gained further
state attention. This Decree formed the ﬁrst comprehensively legal
document on pesticide management and outlined the objectives
of plant protection; the requirements for pesticide production,
formulation, distribution, and use; the responsibility and rights
of relevant state ofﬁces in monitoring and inspecting activities
related to pesticides; and the establishment of a plant protection
system from central to district level. The Plant Protection Depart-
ment (PPD) of MARD was put forward as the key administrative
authority in pesticide policy. Besides the main aim of pest and
disease control, the Decree also emphasized pesticide safety for
human health, animals and the environment. To foster plant pro-
tection activities, the Decree encouraged qualiﬁed organizations
and individuals into pesticide business or services. Organizations
belonging to the state agroforestry sector and individuals with
speciﬁed–and regularly updated–technical training on plant
protection met  the required qualiﬁcations for pesticide business.
Advertisement of pesticides of the second category was prohibited.
To tighten the registration, import, production, trade and use of
“restricted use” pesticides, MARD stipulated in 1995 that no new
registration of this category of pesticides was  permitted (except
those used in wood industry, for disinfection and in the health care
system) [17]. In parallel, all organizations and individuals using
“restricted use” pesticides needed to be registered and certiﬁed
[18]. These efforts have contributed to a remarkable reduction of
the import of “restricted use” pesticides, i.e., from roughly 40% of
the total pesticide imports in 1991 to 5.0% in 1998 [19].
However, despite this achievement illegally imported pesti-
cides remained widely available, including those of the forbidden
category, as ofﬁcially admitted in Directive no. 29/1998/CT-TTg
[20]. Challenged by this fact, pesticides became further regulated
by the government. At the turn of the millennium, pesticides are
considered “a special good with strict limitations in trade”. All
activities related to pesticides such as registration, import, produc-
tion, export, storage, transport, trade and use were put under state
regulation [21]. In addition, the Decree no. 92-CP was amended
in 2002, when IPM-based pest and disease control was further
emphasized [22]. Within agriculture, vegetables have received
special state attention, due to high pesticide residues associated
with intensive and improper pesticide uses. In 2005, MARD issued
a speciﬁc list of pesticides for vegetables, containing 241 pesticide
trade names out of the total 959 listed in that year [23].
All new pesticides either imported or formulated in Vietnam
legally require registration at MARD. Part of the registration pro-
cedure is a ﬁeld trial, which aims to determine pesticide efﬁcacy,
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Figure 1. Number of pesticide Ais and formulated pesticides in Vietnam, 1999 till 200810.
Note: Ai = Active ingredient
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nd (possible) side-effects on plants, human health, animals and
he environment. The ﬁeld trial has to be carried out in the two
ain agricultural areas of Vietnam simultaneously, by two  state
esticide Control Centers [24]. For vegetables, fruit crops and tea,
eld trials also need to evaluate pre-harvest interval and the effects
n food quality [25]. Biological pesticides have been given priority
n research, investment, production, trade and use. To advance
iological pesticides MARD stipulated in 2002 that biological
esticides do not have to follow the same registration regulations
s for chemical pesticides (that is: no ﬁeld trials [26]). However,
ollowing the fast and uncontrolled development of biological
esticide formulations, biological pesticides recently became also
ubjected to ﬁeld-trial (be it on a smaller scale, requiring less time,
nd lower fees compared to chemical pesticides) [27].
Pesticide users have to strictly follow guidelines of technical
taff and of labels on pesticide packaging to ensure proper appli-
ation regarding dosage, application timing, and crops. Users are
esponsible for their activities related to improper use of pesticides
nd the use of banned or unknown-origin pesticides. However,
tate ofﬁcials see these requirements as warnings for farmers, in
tead of rules that have to be enforced and sanctioned in case of
iolation.
. Developments on the pesticide market
From the early 1990s onward, the pesticide market has changed
ramatically in Vietnam. Many pesticide companies have been
stablished, new retailers have come into business, and the market
s overwhelmed by an annual increase of pesticide trade names.
ccording to Vietnamese regulation, one pesticide applicant can
nly register one product under one pesticide trade name. How-
ver, pesticide companies obtain multiple trade names for the same
roduct, simply by marginally changing the formulation of the pes-
icides. Hence, the Vietnamese pesticide market now consists of a
arge number of pesticide trade names. For instance, between 1999
nd 2008, the number of active ingredients (Ai) has almost dou-
led; while the number of trade names has increased 3.6 times1
see Figure 1). Pesticides of toxic category II, U and unknown (UK)2ave especially increased, both in terms of Ai and trade names. In Ai
erms, pesticides of toxic category II increased 1.3 times, category
 1.6 and category UK 3.7. In trade name terms, pesticides of toxic
1 These Ais and formulations include insecticides, fungicides and herbicides “per-
itted” and with “restricted use”.
2 All active ingredients are searched for toxicity from [28] and PAN Pesticides
atabase. Ia = extreme hazardous; Ib = highly hazardous; II = moderately hazardous;
II  = slightly hazardous; U = unlikely to present an acute hazard in normal use; and
 = obsolete as pesticide, not classiﬁed. Pesticides not found in these data sources
re  deﬁned as unknown (UK) pesticides.category II increased 2.8 times, U category 3.3, and UK category 8.8
(Figure 2). Many pesticides of category UK are newly formulated
pesticides, which have not been updated in the 2004 WHO  toxicity
classiﬁcation. A number of UK pesticides are relatively safe for both
human health and environment, such as Abamectin, Acetamiprid,
Indoxacarb3 and biological substances such as Emamectin ben-
zoate and Matrine. The increase of pesticide trade names does
probably not only reﬂect the drive of by pesticide companies to sup-
ply more trade names, but also demand from other market actors
such as retailers and farmers. The increasing number of pesticide
trade names of category II is associated with an increasing use of
category II pesticides by farmers. This is conﬁrmed by farm moni-
toring data in Dong Anh district (Hanoi) between 2003 and 2007.
Pesticide Ai quantity of category II had increased from 18.4% to
40.6% [15].
The increase in number of Ais and trade names comes together
with increased competition between and among pesticide com-
panies and retailers. To cope with growing competition, most
(Vietnamese) companies are relying on cheaper pesticides, mostly
imported from China. For instance, in value terms, legal pesti-
cide imports from China have increased remarkably, from US$22.5
millions in 2000 to US$200.3 millions in 2008 (and from 16% to 42%
of the total pesticide import value). Besides their value also quantity
of the legally imported pesticides grew exponentially, especially in
the period of 2003 and 2007 (Figure 2).
In addition to the legally imported pesticides (as mentioned in
Figure 2), the Ministry of Industry and Trade estimates that about
30-35% of the pesticides currently used in Vietnam is imported
illegally [39]. Aggregated pesticide imports and use are thus signiﬁ-
cantly higher than reported in ofﬁcial statistics. Among the illegally
imported pesticides many are highly toxic and forbidden for use in
Vietnam. In 2007, more than 21 tons illegal pesticides were conﬁs-
cated by PPD inspection teams [38]. In 2007, 13 out of 83 inspected
pesticides on the market violated labeling and quality regulations
[40]. Of the 5,347 pesticide companies and retailers inspected, 12%
were violating pesticide regulations such as selling illegal pesti-
cides [40]. And 18% of 8,200 farmers monitored were violating
regulations, such as improper use of pesticides and/or use of illegal
pesticides [41].
MARD has taken very limited actions to restrict or ban highly
toxic pesticides. Over the period 1999 to 2008, Endosulfan was  the
only pesticide removed from the market (in 2006), and Methomyl
was the only pesticide restricted in its use (in 2002). New safer pes-
ticides have been simply added to the market, rather than replacing
old and highly toxic ones. The removal of highly toxic pesticides
3 These three insecticides are increasingly used and belong to the 10 most used
pesticides in our 2006 farm monitoring research (as reported more in detail in [15].
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Pigure 2. Pesticide import value and quantity (in ﬁnished form) from major countr
ource: [33]; Anh 2004; personal interviews PPD and MARD in 2004; [3]; [34]; [35–38
ata).
i.e., category Ia and Ib) and the reduction of category II pesticides
emains highly urgent in Vietnam. Hence, despite the increase of
ules and policies, regulation of the pesticide market has been a fail-
re rather than a success, as ofﬁcially revealed by a high-ranking
fﬁcial of PPD (MARD) recently [42].
. Weak environmental state institutions
The failure to regulate and reform the Vietnamese pesticide
arket can be explained to a major extent by the functioning of
tate authorities responsible for pesticide management.
.1. Governance structure
Part of the problem lies in the strict hierarchical and isolated
osition of MARD ofﬁcials in the capital Hanoi, vis-à-vis the
ocal ﬁeldworkers of the PPD in the provinces. To a large extent,
igh ranking ofﬁcials of MARD are the sole decision makers for
egulations related to pesticides, with little or even no inputs from
xternal actors or even from local PPD staff. The local PPD staff
nterviewed revealed their “surprise” over the many pesticide
rade names authorized by MARD and their lack of control on
hat process. Centralized policy making of MARD in Hanoi has
ot been embedded in the social, economic and policy networks
f rural Vietnam. A head of a district PPD in Hung Yen said that
ver two recent years, he received the annual list of approved
nd “restricted use” pesticides, as issued by MARD. None of the
armers and retailers interviewed were aware of the MARD lists of
esticides. Many regulations and registrations of MARD are thus
dded to the piles of documents, and not really enforced in practice.
This reﬂects on PPD staff who are motivated and committed
o their work, as they face signiﬁcant obstacles from their superi-
rs and other state agencies in effective enforcement. For instance,
n Hai Duong province the intervention of a ministerial ofﬁcial
revented that investigations in illegal pesticides were made pub-
ic or legally addressed (PPD ofﬁcial Hai Duong, personal interview
n November, 2006).  Faced by such challenges, pesticide manage-
ent staffs often become less motivated. For instance, there is little
ooperation between and among PPD and MARD ofﬁcials from dif-
erent district or provinces. If PPD ofﬁcials discover that farmers
ithin their jurisdiction use forbidden pesticides that are boughtrom a retailer in another district/province, PPD ofﬁcials often take
o further action, not even informing their colleagues. These ofﬁ-
ials ﬁnd no economic or political incentive to do so (Hai Duong
PD, personal interview, November, 2006). The head of Hanoi PPDorigin11.
8] (import quantity from 2004 to 2006 estimated due to unavailability of statistical
revealed that when her team discovered a large volume of expired
pesticides, she requested the company to recollect and destroy it.
However, the company did not respond to her request and she
found it difﬁcult to enforce this on the company, being afraid of
violence (Hanoi PPD, personal interview in December, 2005).  And
not without reason, as other examples show. In 2002 a provincial
interdepartmental inspection team of Hung Yen province discov-
ered large-scale smuggling of Chinese pesticide (Methamidophos).
When attempts to bribe members of the team failed, the pesticides
were dispersed in front of the inspection team by the illegal traders.
The informed district police and communal authorities provided
no cooperation to the local inspection team to solve this violence
(Hung Yen inspection team, personal interview in November 2006).
During their inspections, PPD ofﬁcials are regularly attacked by
retailers and their relatives, as for instance happened in Gia Xuyen
district, Hai Duong province in 2004.
The rule of law and enforcement of pesticide regulations are
thus systematically undermined in Vietnam. PPD staff members
are responding rather to the wish of higher ranking ofﬁcials, than
to legally deﬁned tasks and responsibilities. In other words, the
administrative (and political) system of Vietnam is being oper-
ated on the basis of “who you know” and “who you depend on”,
in stead of on basis of the rule of law. For instance, when a sci-
entist published his research on chemicals used for fruit storing
in a newspaper, he was  disciplined by his superior for “provid-
ing information to a newspaper without permission of the head”
[43]. The strict “guidance” of higher ranking ofﬁcials is consid-
ered a ﬁnancial and political safety-belt for the local staff, because
the high-ranking ofﬁcials decide on ﬁnancial resources and pro-
tect the staff from interferences from other individuals/sectors with
competing interests. For instance, in Van Giang district, Hung Yen
province, a large-scale pesticide inspection in 2003 conﬁscated
173 kg illegal pesticides. However, since then no such inspection
has been organized and ﬁnancially approved by the District Peo-
ple’s Committee. The allocated and approved–by the District People
Committee–budget for 2003 inspections have not been transferred.
Since then, the pesticide retailing system of the district experienced
only two  inspections annually conducted by the provincial PPD.
These have proven hardly effective regarding inspection scale and
conﬁscation of illegal pesticides.
Besides the poor vertical cooperation within the MARD manage-
ment system, also horizontal cooperation between MARD and other
ministries falls short. For instance, deﬁnitions, formulations and
types of pesticides were speciﬁed in the 1993 MARD Ordinance, but
the 1997 import/export tariffs of the Ministry of Finance introduced
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ew and ambiguous deﬁnitions for pesticides [44]. Similarly, the
inistry of Finance tried to impose a 5% tax on pesticides in the
id-1990s, but the decision met  ﬁerce opposition of the pesticide
ompanies. As there had been no consultation with MARD and the
inistry of Science, Technology and Environment4, there was  little
cientiﬁc justiﬁcation for the tax system and the national and inter-
ational companies were able to argue against its logic and the tax
ad to be cancelled [45].
.2. Corruption
In these state failures, close connections between state ofﬁcials
nd pesticide companies and resulting corruption in the pesticide
egistration processes and in control and enforcement play major
oles. It is estimated that 5-10% of pesticide registrations fail, due to
nadequate biological efﬁcacy (as proven in ﬁeld-trials conducted
y PPD). According to regulation of the Ministry of Finance, the
egistration fee is roughly US$6,500 and US$1,500 for a new chem-
cal and biological pesticide trade name, respectively. More than
0% of this fee is related to ﬁeld-trial activities. Of the fee collected
or ﬁeld-trials, 80% is managed and used by MARD for ﬁeld-trial
rrangements, including extra staff time, and the remaining 20%
oes to the state treasurer [46]. The increase in new pesticide trade
ame registration enhances the income for MARD staff. This nega-
ively affects the objective and meticulous implementation of the
esticide registration process. For instance, the time to perform a
eld-trial for one chemical product is set at two years in the state
egulations. However, as revealed by pesticide companies, depend-
ng on the product and on the applicants, it may be shortened to
everal months or extended to more than 2 years.5 This “ﬂexibility”
n pesticide registration time of MARD is related to the “temporal
haracteristic”6 of pesticides and causes a race among pesticide
ompanies to shorten registration time or even disobey the regula-
ions, for instance by producing and distributing pesticides without
egal registration. For this reason, pesticide companies often bribe
fﬁcials, even though the documents to support ofﬁcial pesticide
egistration procedures are present. Thus, as revealed by pesticide
ompanies, the total expense for registration of a new pesticide
rade name (without ICAMA) is roughly $12,000 (staff of pesticide
ompanies, personal interviews July 14, 2006 and March 5, 2008).
hese practices also provide a major incentive for state ofﬁcials to
llow the growth to trade names, as it increases state and personal
ncomes.
At lower governance level, PPD ofﬁcials cooperate with pesti-
ide companies to push retailers to use pesticides of “additional
ost”. Often retailers have to accept the “rules of the game”, to
revent administrative difﬁculties from PPD staff [47]. In a more
ophisticated way, PPD staff use their legitimacy as state experts to
uggest pesticides to farmers from companies to which they have
economic) relations, rather than effective and (environmentally)
afe pesticides. PPD ofﬁcials even protect violating pesticide com-
anies, for instance by refusing to disclose the names of violating
ompanies [48].
But ineffective pesticide management also moves beyond the
evel of individual PPD and MARD registration staff and individual
4 This was split in 2002 into the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
nd the Ministry of Science and Technology.
5 For instance, ﬁeld-trial staff could evoke various reasons for delay of the ﬁeld-
rial such as all trial ﬁelds are occupied, or no or less target pests (as registered for
esticides) appeared during the trial etc.
6 The rapid emergence of resistance against pesticides among crops is shortening
he  period of effectiveness for many [formulated] pesticides with old Ais (mainly
riginating from China). For these reasons, once a local Vietnamese company decides
o  market a new product, it will do this as quickly as possible to take advantage of
he  temporary opportunities [15].al of Life Sciences 67 (2013) 19– 26 23
trade name registrations. It has also emerged at a more systematic
level of state failures. Given the ineffective state auditing system
and the absence of public participation in policy making, policy
makers have been able to issue regulations in favour of certain
individuals or groups, and at the expense of public interest. For
instance, the “ﬂexibilities” and shortcomings in MARD policies have
been notiﬁed recently. According to the Ministry of Justice, out of
the 800 policy documents issued by MARD in the period 2003-2008,
200 are not in line with the different laws [49]. Thus, the “ﬂexibil-
ity” of MARD may  allow some policy document to be contradictory
to the regulations issued by MARD itself. For instance, several
chemical pesticides were illegally privileged to have a fast track
and cheaper registration procedure, similar to what is only allowed
for biological pesticides. In 2001, formulations of Deltamethrin
(WHO toxic category II), combinations of Dimethoate (category
II) and Fenvalerate (category II), and formulations of Ethoprophos
(category Ia) were allowed such a fast and cheap registration
trajectory [50]. Formulations of Tricyclazole (category II) and
Metaldehyde (category II) received the same registration privilege
[51,52].
The close connection between certain MARD ofﬁcials and
pesticide companies is not limited to the registration process
for individual companies, but also retards implementation and
enforcement practices. Despite the fact that Paraquat7 is a noto-
rious pesticide and has been banned in many countries, in Vietnam
it was  put in the category of “restricted use” pesticides in 1999, but
replaced into the ﬁrst category (no restrictions) in the following
years. This reversal of Paraquat was  mainly caused by a “diplo-
matic” arrangement between the company that registered most
Paraquat trade names and MARD, as revealed by a staff member
of that company. This retarded MARD ofﬁcials from taking further
effective action to control Paraquat use after registration approval,
and resulted in an increasing number of pesticide trade names reg-
istered, distributed and used in Vietnam.
5.3. Information shortage
In all these policy processes information plays a major role but is
not always available. At present, the state registration of pesticides
mainly focuses on biological efﬁcacy, and preharvest interval for a
limited number of crops, such as vegetable and tea. Environmen-
tal impacts of pesticides are mainly judged based on (available)
technical information (such as the Chinese ICAMA certiﬁcate), as
provided by pesticide companies. However, as an ofﬁcial of the
Advisory Committee for Pesticides (of MARD) indicates, ICAMA data
are not always available for MARD to judge pesticide registration8
(ofﬁcial Advisory Committee for Pesticides, personal interviews Dec,
2005 and Feb, 2009). The unavailability of technical information on
Chinese pesticides complicates the assessment of environmental
impacts of newly imported pesticides.
Besides limited availability, information is also strategically
(mis)used. As information is highly centralized and countervailing
information is often missing or disregarded, the consequences
can be large. For instance, international scientiﬁc evidence existed
that pesticides were the cause of, rather than the solution to,
the Brown planthopper problem on rice. To gain that insight,
Indonesia has paid high costs in controlling Brown planthopper
by applying pesticides [9]. However, more than 20 years later
7 In 2008, there were 24 pesticide trade names containing Paraquat.
8 This is explained by one ofﬁcial of MARD, who declared that companies are,
as  a new rule, allowed to submit the ICAMA certiﬁcate later. In order to support
the seasonal characteristics of pesticide business, MARD expects this new rule to
shorten the time between import and distribution of pesticides (Hanoi PPD, personal
interview July 2006).
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Table 1
Perception of retailers and farmers on current pesticide market.
% of retailers (n = 45) % of farmers (n = 125)
Improved 84% 72%
Delta provinces shows modest improvements relates to the eco-
nomic situation of farmers. In a nationwide survey conducted by
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and MARD in
104 P. Van Hoi et al. / NJAS - Wageningen
ietnam seems to have learned little from the documented
ndonesian experience. Responding to the recent massive infection
f rice by the Brown planthopper in southern Vietnam, the central
overnment decided to subsidize pesticides by 100% [53]. No clear
lan existed within MARD for (long-term) nonchemical-based
rown planthopper control [54]. As the Indonesian case shows,
ssigning the responsibility for pesticide policy to crop protection
pecialists does not automatically result in a rational set of policies
9].
Apart from this, information is also often adjusted in accordance
ith political interests, without much independent control on the
eliability of information. Hence, Vietnamese statistics are often
ot very reliable (cf. [55]). A communal PPD staff in Dong Anh
istrict reported 8 pesticide retailers in her commune. However
he district PPD only recorded 6. It proved that only 3 retailers
of the 8) obtained a certiﬁcate for their business, and the dis-
rict PPD found it problematic to report 5 businesses without a
egal certiﬁcate to higher ofﬁcials. Similarly, information of pes-
icide retailing and use in so called “safe vegetable cooperatives”
s often adjusted to provide a better outcome in the comparison
ith normal vegetable production areas. Manipulation of informa-
ion is sometimes quite advanced. Used-pesticide packages that
armers normally leave behind in agricultural ﬁelds are increas-
ngly included in inspections into illegal pesticides. Nowadays, the
ackaging is often collected before (pre-)informed visits of dis-
rict/provincial ofﬁcials and inspection teams take place. The higher
anking ofﬁcials and inspection teams remain de facto deprived
rom reality.
.4. Weak jurisdiction
Vietnam’s jurisdiction is also subjected to corruption and dis-
ortion, in favor of political and economic interests of the elites at
he expense of the poor. To solve disputes Vietnamese ﬁrms and
ndividuals rely on private negotiation or third party mediation,
ather than on the legal court. For instance, from a survey among
,500 ﬁrms conducted by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and
ndustry (VCCI), only 0.8% saw courts as the best dispute resolution
echanism, 2.1% as second best, and 5.5% as third best. Most ﬁrms
refer informal mechanisms for dispute resolution [56], but this
pproach disfavors the deprived. In summer 2008 the entire rice
arvest of a farmer in Long An province was destroyed by using
ut-of-date pesticides, causing a loss of US$11,000. The pesticide
ompany did not reimburse the farmers; and challenged the farmer
o proceed to the court if he disagreed [57]. The disfunctioning
uridical system of Vietnam disadvantages farmers, who lack power
nd knowledge to cope with powerful and rent-seeking pesticide
ompanies and state ofﬁcials.
. Local signs of hope
Although the improvements in pesticide registration and use
re generally poor at the national level, some local counter tenden-
ies have been found. In contradiction to the information provided
y the Ministry of Industry and Trade (cf. [39]), 90% of the retailers
e interviewed indicated that the increase of pesticides of Chi-
ese origin goes together with a reduction in illegally imported
hinese pesticides. According to these retailers, before 2000 ille-
al Chinese pesticides9 accounted for 50%-70% of their turnover,
ut presently (2008) they account for less than 10%. This reduc-
ion of illegal pesticides goes together with many new pesticides
9 Pesticides that are illegally imported contain either Ais banned or permitted to
se  in Vietnam.No change 16% 16%
Worse 0% 12%
with higher biological efﬁcacy, considerably improving the pesti-
cide market according to 84% of the retailers and 72% of the farmers
we interviewed (cf. Table 1). Also in earlier research we found that
in the perception of retailers and farmers the exponential growth
of pesticide imports between 2003 and 2007 went together with a
shift towards more expensive and safer pesticides used by farmers,
although not with signiﬁcant changes in the quantity of pesticides
used per ha per cropping season [15]. Anecdotal evidence seems to
point in the same direction. The head of Gia Lam PPD estimated that
in his district over the past 10-15 year the volume of pesticide Ais
reduced from about 500 kg to about 100 kg, due to lower concen-
trations of active ingredient (personal interview in August, 2008).
The 12% of farmers that considered the current pesticide market
worse than 10 years ago point to the large number of pesticide
trade names as well as to the low biological efﬁcacy of pesticides.
It is not so much the state and state policies that are driving
these local improvements in pesticide markets and use. The
positive shift in pesticide distribution and use in the research area
should be explained mainly by changes in farmer’s perception and
knowledge regarding pesticide quality and health. Several exam-
ples can illustrate the mechanisms at work. A farmer in Dong
Anh district bought a highly toxic pesticide (Methamidophos),
but fear of cancer stopped her from using it (personal observation
in August, 2007).  And, a poor farmer in Gialam district insisted
with her retailer to sell her a safe pesticide (Indoxacard) rather
than a cheaper but highly toxic alternative (personal observation
in August, 2008).  Increased farmer knowledge on and demand
for pesticides of better efﬁcacy and safety forced retailers into
more cooperative relations with farmers, and thus to promote
more expensive pesticides with high efﬁcacy and safety (and often
lower proﬁts; cf. [15]). Retailers sometimes proactively change
farmer pesticide use. A retailer in Hung Yen said that in 2006 the
provincial television and local PPD ofﬁcials promoted pesticide
Dihet 60WP (a combined active ingredient of Nereistoxin 58%
and Imidacloprid 2%) to ﬁght the rice borer. However, Nereistoxin
is also the main Ai in SatTrungDan 5H (also used for rice borer),
which proved signiﬁcantly less effective than the pesticide Padan
50SP (containing Cartap). The prices of Dihet 60WP and Padan
50SP were the same and he convinced his farmers not to use
Dihet 60WP. Though Dihet 60WP was still distributed by other
retailers, after one or two cropping season(s), Dihet 60WP was no
longer used in this area. But such market-driven elimination of
low quality pesticides proceeds very slow.
An explanation for the absence of improvements in pesticide
use in nation-wide ﬁgures, while our survey in three red RiverIn annual list of pesticides, MARD count types of active ingredients for both
single and combined ones. However, for purpose of this paper with its focus on
environment, single Ais are considered and counted. For combined Ais, the toxicity
is  determined by the most toxic Ai presented in the combination. Similarly, MARD
counts pesticide formulation based on registered (common) trade names other than
on  content of other materials mixed with Ais for ﬁnal products (trade names), which
are  counted in this paper with much larger ﬁgures.
11 These ﬁgures include small quantities of pesticides that Vietnam re-exports to
other countries, such as Cambodia.
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Table  2
Important improvements for future pesticide management in Vietnam.
Solution % of retailers
(n = 45)
% of farmers
(n = 125)
Pesticides of better quality 32% 40%
More effective state management 23% 21%
Better technical knowledge retailers 19% 8%
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No response 0% 28%12
000, only 22% of farmers growing vegetables and roughly 35%
f those growing major fruits (i.e., longan, litchi, rambutan) were
eported to use pesticides [58]. In addition, agricultural sown area
as increased from 21.2 million ha in 2001 to 24.7 ha in 2006
roughly 16.4%) [59]. The fast increase of pesticide imports in
ecent years is related to the increase in farmers being able to
ccess pesticides for pest and disease control, and partly in increase
f agricultural area. These newcomers in pesticide use mostly live
n poorer areas and have less experience with pesticides. Hence,
hey use more cheap, low quality and highly toxic pesticides.
his is even observed within the three provinces under study.
or instance, our farmer’s surveys identiﬁed two  illegal Chinese
esticides used in the wealthy Gialam district (Hanoi), but seven
n the poorer Giaxuyen district (Hai Duong province).
Though a positive shift in pesticide distribution and use can
e observed in our study areas, considerable room remains
or improving pesticide imports, formulation, distribution and
se and private actors may  continue to urge for better pol-
cy measures. The most important measure is the promotion
f better quality pesticides and improved technical knowledge
mong farmers. Most farmers prioritize better quality of reg-
stered pesticides (biological efﬁcacy and safety) and a more
ffective state management system (to reduce the number of pes-
icide trade names, imitated pesticides, and low quality pesticides)
Table 2).
In parallel with the wishes of retailers and farmers, there have
een some signs that the Vietnamese state is trying to keep track
n improving the pesticide market. In reaction to the ineffective-
ess of current policies regarding production, distribution, and use
f chemicals (including pesticides), MARD has taken some adjust-
ents in her policies regarding pesticide registration as well as
PM promotion. Recently, MARD has designed a new regulation for
 ﬁeld-trial in combination with registration of biological pesti-
ides (cf. [27]). A stricter control over biological pesticides could
artly help to reduce the large number of pesticide trade names
nd of counterfeits, one of the key problems in current pesticide
olicies. Similarly, in IPM promotion, though thousands of farm-
rs have been trained in IPM under the support of international
rganizations such as NORAD, DANIDA, FAO, CIDSE, and ACIAR, the
mounts of pesticides used has not reduced signiﬁcantly and pesti-
ides applied on vegetables remain a serious problem. According to
he Hung Yen provincial PPD ofﬁcial, IPM training courses selected
articipants from different villages and they were unable to dis-
eminate their IPM knowledge to the numerous farmers in their
illage. In 2007 MARD redesigned its IPM training strategy; with
ore farmers trained (and inspired) at the same time in one village
evel, IPM adoption on vegetables is expected to increase. However,
iven tens of millions of farmers, low cooperation among farmers,
oor regulation compliance by farmers, and a stunted state budget,
PM training will be a very expensive and time-consuming choice
n Vietnam.
12 The high percentage of farmers without response on pesticides improvements
ould be explained by their distrust in state pesticide regulation enforcement as
ell  as in pesticide market actors to bring about improvements.
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7. Conclusion
Despite advanced pesticide regulations oriented towards safer
pesticides and reduced pesticide dependency, there has been a
failure of Vietnam’s pesticide policy, visible in the exponential
growth of both quantity and value of imported pesticides. Paral-
lel with increasingly strict pesticide regulations, the Vietnamese
state enlarged the access to pesticides for wider groups of farmers.
This is the main explanation for the growth in imported pesticides.
However, the growing import of newly formulated (and safer) pes-
ticides did not replace the highly toxic and low quality ones. This
pesticide market has contributed to unsustainable practices among
vegetable growers: the adoption of high dosages, cocktails of pesti-
cides, and the application of inadequate preharvest intervals takes
place especially in poorer areas.
As our empirical data revealed, a slight shift towards more
expensive and safer pesticides, a reduction of illegally imported
pesticides from China, and some elimination of unnecessary pes-
ticides from the market has largely been driven by farmers. In
our study, farmers that are better-off and have more technical
knowledge contributes to a more favorable pesticide performance.
Unlike farmers in richer areas like Hanoi–who have been to a
certain extent, active and reﬂexive in pesticide selection and
use - those in poorer areas continue to suffer from low quality
and imitation pesticides that are still widely available in Viet-
nam.
At the national level, there has been no consistent improve-
ment observed in pesticide market so far. State authorities have
signiﬁcantly contributed to these pesticide policy failures. An
inadequate governance structure, corruption, too close relations
between authorities and pesticide producers, and absence of reli-
able information and a well functioning juridical system can explain
this.
Restructuring the current pesticide market should thus be the
ﬁrst priority of Vietnam to eliminate unnecessary and highly toxic
pesticides. Other government interventions, i.e. a more stringent
and enforced pesticide registration process and promoting IPM-
based pest control strategy can be suggested. These interventions,
however will require strong political commitment and ethic, and
a further public participation in decision making and implementa-
tion processes related to pesticides.
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